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The attorney-client privilege protects communications between attorney
and client from public disclosure.' The privilege for individual clients has
a venerable history in the common law.2 However, application of the priv-
1. The classic formulation extends the attorney-client privilege in the following situation: (1)
where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except
when the protection is waived. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at
554 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Wigmore's definition has been incorporated wholesale into much
of the federal common law on attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Humphreys, Hutcheson & Moseley
v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211, 1219 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977); Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
This Note does not address the separate protection of attorney-client communications provided by
the ethical codes of the legal profession. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSiasLsTY EC 4-4 (1980). The professional ethical
considerations forbid voluntary disclosure by the attorney, while the evidentiary privilege prevents a
compulsion of disclosure by a court. Yet another doctrine protects the confidentiality of communica-
tions between attorney and client which constitute attorney work product. See discussion infra notes
97-101 and accompanying text.
2. The evidentiary privilege for attorney-client communications is the oldest of the privileges and
is well established in American common law. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 542; Hazard,
An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1061 (1978). The
common-law attorney-client privilege also has been codified by various state legislatures. See, e.g.,
ALASKA R. EVID. 503 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(2) (1987).
Federal codification of all privilege rules, including attorney-client privilege, is limited to a very
general rule providing that "the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501. The federal
rule also establishes that privileges in diversity actions derive from state, rather than federal, law. Id.
In enacting Rule 501, Congress explicitly rejected the privileges section of the proposed evidence rules
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ilege to public agencies' lacks a sound basis in the theory underlying the
privilege and may compromise the role of the government in litigation.
Application of the privilege to modern legal relationships has required
courts to examine the scope of the privilege where the client is an organi-
zation or entity rather than a natural person.4 Courts have extended the
attorney-client privilege to shield communications between client corpora-
tions and their attorneys.' However, it is not clear that the privilege
should be givefi the same scope with respect to all organizational clients,
such as public agencies. While an attorney-client privilege for governmen-
tal bodies has been assumed in the cases raising the issue,' and treatises
on evidence echo that assumption,7 the merit of this assumption has not
been thoroughly explored.
This Note considers the function of the attorney-client privilege in the
context of civil litigation to which the federal government is a party. After
examining the basis of the attorney-client privilege as applied to individ-
ual and entity clients, Section I establishes that the privilege applies only
where it serves to protect a relationship or to provide incentives for so-
cially valuable conduct. Section II addresses the applicability of the privi-
lege to communications between an attorney for a federal government
agency' and agency directors or employees and then explains why the
promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1972. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 501-2 to 501-5, 1 501[01] (1988) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE] (summarizing con-
gressional reaction to Proposed Rules of Evidence); see also sources cited infra note 19. Those pro-
posed rules enumerated all privileges to be recognized by federal courts, including the attorney-client
privilege. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503, 56 F.R.D. 235, 235-37 (1972) (Supreme Court proposal
for "lawyer-client privilege" rule). Although Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 was among the
privilege rules for which Congress substituted the general Rule 501, the proposed rule remains a
source for defining the federal common law of the attorney-client privilege. See Citibank, N.A. v.
Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1981) (using proposed federal rule as source of law
regarding privilege for corporate client); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Michigan, Aug.,
1977 (In re Jackier), 434 F. Supp. 648, 649-50 & n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1977), affd per curiam, 570
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978).
3. The Freedom of Information Act defines "agency" as "any executive department, military de-
partment, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the
executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any indepen-
dent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(0 (Supp. IV 1986).
4. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1), 56 F.R.D. 235 (1972) ("client" may be a "corporation,
association, or other organization or entity, either public or private"). When an attorney represents an
amorphous entity, the client can communicate only through individual agents, and questions arise
regarding who may assert or waive the privilege and which communications with which agents are
privileged. The corporate attorney-client privilege is discussed infra Section I-C.
5. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see infra Section I-C.
6. Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Wash. 1975) (analogizing to situation of corporate
client and holding that state prison officials were clients of state Attorney General, so attorney-client
privilege attaches); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Glen Arms Estate, Inc., 230 Cal.
App. 2d 841, 854, 41 Cal. Rptr. 303, 310 (1964) (privilege is same where client is "body politic" as
where client is corporation). Governmental privilege cases are discussed infra Section II.
7. See, e.g., S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 348 (4th ed.
1986) ("[o]rganizations like corporations and government entities" may claim privilege).
8. The functional analysis proposed in this Note has equal applicability to state agencies. State
privilege rules for public entities are discussed infra notes 65-70.
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privilege should not be extended to governmental entities. In addition,
Section II examines current law regarding the claim of privilege by gov-
ernment agencies, addresses the conflict between the privilege and public
policies on secrecy in government, and discusses the limits of the analogy
between corporations and government agencies.
This Note concludes that extension of the attorney-client privilege to
government agencies does not serve the privilege's underlying goals and
conflicts with the principle of open government. The courts therefore
should not apply the corporate attorney-client privilege to communications
between attorneys and government agencies.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Inquiry into attorney-client privilege in the government context must be
framed by a general understanding of the evidentiary privilege. Privileges
are to be construed narrowly and must be justified by the protection of a
special relationship. The traditional purpose of the attorney-client privi-
lege-to promote candor between a client and his legal advisor-has justi-
fied extension of the attorney-client privilege to the client corporation.
A. Privileges as Evidentiary Rules of Exclusion
While most rules of evidence are designed to enhance the search for the
truth by excluding evidence that is weak or prejudicial, rules of privilege
serve substantive goals extrinsic to the litigation. 9 Privileges apply where
certain confidential relationships valued by society would be threatened by
the general rules requiring disclosure.10 The traditional evidentiary privi-
9. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
Wigmore discusses the general duty to disclose information needed by the justice system, see 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2192, at 70-73, and he notes that only particular extrinsic policies can
justify exceptions to the duty to give testimony, id. at 73, § 2285, at 527.
10. Wigmore lists the fundamental conditions necessary to establish a privilege: (1) the communi-
cation must originate in confidence; (2) the element of confidentiality must be essential to the "full
and satisfactory maintenance" of the relationship in question; (3) the relationship must be one which
the community has determined should be "sedulously fostered"; and (4) the injury to the relationship
caused by disclosure of the communications would be greater than the benefit of disclosure to the
"correct disposal" of litigation. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527.
Thus, Wigmore formulated the classic justification for evidentiary privileges: privileges should be
upheld only where confidential communications occur in a relationship which society desires to foster
and where the harm to the relationship from not protecting the confidentiality would be greater than
the harm done by suppressing relevant information. This instrumentalist approach to privileges has
been challenged by some commentators, who urge that privileges serve the ultimate value of privacy
and should not be weighed against litigation interests on a utilitarian scale. See, e.g., Louisell, Confi-
dentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REV. 101
(1956). However, Wigmore's pragmatic approach has been most influential. See, e.g., Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970) (using the individual gain/societal harm balanc-
ing test), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). See generally R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MOD-
ERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 647-51 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing justifications for the privilege); De-
velopments in the Law-Privileged Communications: Attorney-Client Privilege, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1501, 1501-09 (1985) [hereinafter Developments: Attorney-Client Privilege] (same).
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leges protect professional" and private12 relationships by preserving the
confidences of the parties to that relationship. 3
The scope of a privilege is shaped by the privilege's purposes.1 4 For the
privilege to apply, confidentiality must be of value to the relationship and
must have been preserved in the communication.1 5 Furthermore, privi-
leges generally yield where the integrity of the relationship already has
been defeated by the actions of the parties to the relationship, as where
the relationship itself is being litigated.1
11. The professional relationships most frequently protected by privileges are attorney-client and
physician-patient. The physician-patient privilege and the related psychiatrist-patient privilege are
discussed in MCCORMICK, supra note 9, §§ 98-105. See also UNIF. R. EvID. 503, 13 U.L.A. 277
(1974) (physician- and psychotherapist-patient privilege); Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504, 56 F.R.D.
240, 240-41 (1972) (psychotherapist-patient privilege). Some jurisdictions extend privileges to com-
munications with clergymen, accountants, and social workers. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 76.2.
12. A privilege for communications between husband and wife is widely recognized. See MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 9, § 78, at 189 (nearly all states recognize privilege for marital communications);
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951) (confidential communication between husband and wife is
privileged); Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (same); see also Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 45 n.5 (1980) (Wolfe and Blau not disturbed by ruling limiting privilege against adverse
spousal testimony). A child-parent privilege has been proposed, see, e.g., Stanton, Child-Parent Privi-
lege for Confidential Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1982), but
has been severely limited, see In re Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d
244 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 233 (1988); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 896-900
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985). See generally Developments in the Law-Privileged
Communications: Familial Privileges, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1563, 1588-92 (1985) (proposing a limited
privilege for familial relationships).
13. See United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1984) (privileges "protect those inter-
personal relationships which are highly valued by society and peculiarly vulnerable to deterioration
should their necessary component of privacy be continually disregarded by courts of law"). The few
evidentiary privileges that do not protect relationships instead protect important societal interests.
Principal among these is the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See U.S.
CONsT. amend. V. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 118 (discussing policy foundations of
constitutional privilege). Other nonrelational privileges are the various privileges for governmental
secrets, see MCCORMICK, supra §§ 106-13; see also infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text, and
the putative privilege for journalistic sources, see United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 355-56 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See
generally Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications: Institutional Privileges, 98 HARV.
L. REv. 1592 (1985) (discussing, inter alia, governmental privileges and media source privilege).
14. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d
530, 538 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984).
15. The first condition for the establishment of a privilege is that the communication originate in
a confidence. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527; see also supra note 10 (summarizing
Wigmore's formulation of elements essential for privilege). Communications to which a third party is
a witness generally are unprivileged. See MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 74 (privileges generally),
§ 80, at 193-94 (marital communications), § 91 (attorney-client communications). Voluntary disclo-
sure of a communication by the holder of the privilege likewise destroys confidentiality and constitutes
waiver of the privilege. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 511, 56 F.R.D. 258 (1972); 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 2327; id. § 2389 (bringing suit in which physical condition and communication to
physician is at issue constitutes waiver of physician-patient privilege).
16. See United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1986) (lawyer may reveal privileged
communications from client to recover fee or defend against misconduct charges); Tasby v. United
States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974) (privilege is waived when client calls into public question
the competence of the attorney), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125 (1975); see also MCCORMICK, supra
note 9, § 84, at 199-200 (spousal privilege does not apply in controversies between the spouses); id. §
91, at 220 (attorney can defend against charges of malpractice and can fight nonpayment of fees by
revealing relevant confidential communications); Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(d)(3), 56 F.R.D. 235,
236 (1972) (no privilege as to communication relevant to breach of duty by lawyer or client); cf.
MCCORMICK, supra, § 104, at 258 n.5 (physician-patient privilege curtailed in malpractice actions);
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Privileges deny the finder of fact access to information that may be both
relevant and probative.17 The deleterious effects of evidentiary privileges
on the search for the truth urge narrow construction of those privileges.18
Consequently, federal common law 9 essentially incorporates a narrow
approach to questions of attorney-client privilege.2"
B. Policies Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full and
frank communication between clients and their attorneys. 2' The privilege
is motivated by a concern that apprehension about compelled disclosure by
the attorney must be removed to promote candor between client and legal
advisor. 2 The client will speak freely with his attorney when assured that
ALASKA R. EVID. 504(d)(3) (1986) (communications relevant to "issue of breach of duty" arising out
of relationship not protected by physician- and psychotherapist-patient privilege).
17. Professor Saltzburg argues that because the attorney-client privilege generates information
that might not exist were the communication not privileged, no information is "lost" due to the attor-
ney-client privilege. Saltzburg, Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
IowA L. REV. 811, 817-18 (1981); Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychia-
trists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 609-11 (1980) [hereinafter Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals]. The
generation of such information is important to the functioning of the attorney, see infra text accompa-
nying note 24, but the privilege nonetheless withholds the communication from the trier of fact.
18. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (reasoning that privileges should not be
"lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth"). Wig-
more argues:
[P]rivilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its benefits are all indirect and
speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete. . . . It is worth preserving for the sake of a
general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be
strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554; cf. 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL Evi-
DENCE 302-04 (J.S. Mill ed. 1827) (criticizing privilege).
19. The common law governs privilege decisions in federal courts. FED. R. EVID. 501. In 1974,
Congress rejected the codification of evidentiary privileges presented by the Supreme Court in the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 200, at 634-45 (1985) (describing congressional action on proposed privilege rules); see also Devel-
opments in the Law-Privileged Communications: Introduction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1454, 1465-69
(1985) (discussing controversy over proposed privilege rules); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 665, 672 n.19 (1983) (suggesting that Congress
was looking to the courts to develop federal privilege rules); supra note 2.
20. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (privilege "applies only where
necessary to achieve its purpose"); United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158, 1160 (11th Cir.) (because
attorney-client privilege "serves to obscure the truth," it should be construed as narrowly as is consis-
tent with its purpose), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 505 (1987); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-
35, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Since the attorney-client privilege may serve as a mechanism
to frustrate the investigative or fact-finding process, it creates an inherent tension with society's need
for full and complete disclosure of all relevant evidence . . . . These competing societal interests
demand that application of the privilege not exceed that which is necessary to effect the policy consid-
erations underlying the privilege, i.e., 'the privilege must be upheld only in those circumstances for
which it was created.'" (quoting In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
994 (1980))); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir.) (privilege should be confined
within "narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle"), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
976 (1964).
21. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 51 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
470 (1888).
22. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 545; Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 636 (2d
Cir. 1962) (adopting Wigmore's statement), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
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his revelations will not be disclosed without his consent;2" in turn, this
communication allows the attorney to provide informed advice and to
function effectively in the adversary legal system.24
Since the purpose of the privilege is to assure the client that communi-
cations with his attorney are confidential, the ability of the individual cli-
ent to assert or waive the privilege is critical. The attorney-client privilege
belongs to the client and the client alone.2 5 A client may assert the privi-
lege even when not a party to the litigation at hand.26
The attorney-client privilege for individual criminal defendants has a
constitutional foundation in the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."1 However, the attorney-client priv-
23. Whether the attorney-client privilege actually does encourage such communication has not
been verified empirically. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Share-
holder Litigation, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 303, 306 (1977) (benefits of privilege are unverifiable); Note,
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged
Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1262 (1962) (limited survey of laymen inconclusive).
Nonetheless, most courts and commentators agree that "incentive to confide is at least partially depen-
dent upon the client's ability to predict that the communication will be held in confidence." In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979). For discussion of the
dilution of the incentive in the corporate context, see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
24. Professional legal expertise is necessary to guide litigants through procedural rules, to protect
the legal rights of parties, and to facilitate the legal process by screening out spurious claims. See
Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals, supra note 17, at 605-06 (describing attorney's special role
in legal system); see also Clute v. Davenport Co., 118 F.R.D. 312, 314 (D. Conn. 1988) (Blumenfeld,
J.) ("The purpose of the privilege, most basically stated, is to shelter the confidences a client shares
with his or her attorney when seeking legal advice, in the interest of protecting a relationship that is a
mainstay of our system of justice.").
25. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 92, at 221; see, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 850
(1st Cir. 1983) (privilege may be waived only by client); Schnell v. Schnall, 550 F. Supp. 650, 653
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (attorney's testimony does not waive privilege where client did not consent); Ex
parte Lipscomb, 111 Tex. 409, 415, 239 S.W. 1101, 1103 (1922) (attorney may not assert privilege
on own behalf).
26. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2321, at 629; MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 92, at 222-23;
see also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 513 (D. Conn.) (privilege not limited to legal
consultations in litigation situations; corporations should be encouraged to seek legal advice to avoid
litigation as well as to pursue it), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976).
27. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405 (1976) (if defendant is privileged from produc-
ing information, attorney may not be compelled to produce same information); Caldwell v. United
States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (trial invalidated because government secret agent was party to
conferences between accused and defense counsel), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955); Coplon v.
United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (government intrusion into attorney-client relationship
violated defendant client's sixth amendment rights), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952); see also Haz-
ard, supra note 2, at 1062 (privilege necessary to protect right to counsel and privilege against self-
incrimination); Comment, Extending the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Constitutional Mandate, 13
PAc. L.J. 437, 441-42 (1982) (protection of fifth and sixth amendment rights fundamental to privi-
lege); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement,
91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 485-86 (1977). But see Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
1978) (evidentiary privilege does not assume constitutional dimensions); Magida v. Continental Can
Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (no implicit constitutional requirement that lawyer-client
confidence regarding civil claims be protected), af/'d, 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
972 (1956); Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals, supra note 17, at 603 n.14 (discouraging consti-
tutionalization of privileges).
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ilege is not limited to the criminal defendant; indeed, the privilege applies
to lawyer-client discussion in numerous contexts."8
C. Corporate Privilege
It is now universally recognized that the attorney-client privilege ap-
plies to corporate clients.-" A corporation may assert the attorney-client
privilege to protect the flow of information between the organization and
the attorney advising the corporation. ° The privilege has been extended
to corporations by analogizing organizations to individual clients." Codifi-
cations of the attorney-client privilege generally refer to the holder of the
privilege as the "client" rather than an "individual," and definitions of
"client" in those codifications often explicitly include corporations. 2
When a lawyer represents a corporation, the lawyer's client is the entity
itself, not any individual employee, director, or stockholder. 3 The client
28. For example, the privilege is not limited to communications between attorney and client in
preparation for litigation. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 545; id. § 2294, at 563; see also
Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 358 (1891) ("If he consulted him in the capacity of an
attorney, and the communication was in the course of his employment,... neither the payment of a
fee nor the pendency of litigation was necessary to entitle him to the privilege."); Coastal States Gas
Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (privilege "extends to all situa-
tions in which an attorney's counsel is sought on a legal matter"); Continental Oil Co. v. United
States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964). Furthermore, the privilege protects not only communica-
tions from the client to the lawyer, but also protects communications from lawyer to client, at least if
they tend to disclose the client's confidential communications. See Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. IRS,
768 F.2d 719, 720-21 (5th Cir. 1985). The consultation must, however, involve use of the attorney as
a legal professional rather than business adviser. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(b), 56 F.R.D. 235,
236 (1972); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359-60 (D. Mass. 1950)
(communication soliciting business advice not privileged). In addition, consultations for the purpose of
furthering illegal activities are not privileged. See MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 95, at 229-31; Pro-
posed Fed. R. Evid. 503 (d)(1), 56 F.R.D. 236 (1972); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); United States v. Laurins, 659 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
29. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
929 (1963); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (addressing scope of privilege
as applied to corporate clients); United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336
(1915) (recognizing extension of privilege to corporate client); MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 87, at
206-07 (debating scope, but not application, of privilege to corporate client).
30. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) ("Both for
corporations and individuals, the attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and
frank communications between attorneys and their clients."). The privilege applies to "in-house" cor-
porate counsel as it does to "outside" counsel, see In re LTV Securities Litig., 86 F.R.D. 595, 601
(N.D. Tex. 1981); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 394-95 (approving privilege for
communications to company's general counsel), although where in-house counsel has extra-legal busi-
ness responsibilities, only communications made in counsel's legal capacity are privileged, see In re
Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 1146, 1167 (D.S.C. 1975).
31. One author has suggested that the privilege initially was extended to corporations in the nine-
teenth century because simple business structure and identification of a corporation with its owner-
manager gave a corporation a personal identity. Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications
of Corporate Clients-Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DEr. L.J. 299, 310 (1963).
32. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 209(a) (1942); Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1),
56 F.R.D. 235 (1972); CAL EVID. CODE § 954 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(1)
(1987); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(2) (Supp. 1987).
33. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (authority to waive
attorney-client privilege passes with control of corporation; displaced managers do not preserve the
privilege for their communications with counsel); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
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corporation retains the attorney-client privilege and may choose to waive
the privilege and disclose the information gathered by counsel. 4
Adapting the scope of the privilege to the structure of a corporate "cli-
ent," which communicates with its attorneys through agents 5 and em-
ployees, presents complicated questions."' The "control group" theory for
the attorney-client privilege extended the privilege to communications by a
corporate employee if the employee was in a position to control the action
the corporation might take on the advice of the attorney. However, the
individual corporate agents who furnish essential information to the attor-
ney for a corporation often are not empowered to direct the corporation's
litigation and therefore inadequately personify the corporate client. In
Upjohn Co. v. United States,8 the Supreme Court extended the federal
corporate attorney-client privilege to include a corporate attorney's com-
munications with employees of the corporation outside the corporate man-
agerial control group.
39
SIBILITY EC 5-18 (1986) (lawyer retained by corporation owes allegiance to entity); MODEL RuLs..s
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1987) (same). Corporate counsel may represent individual
employees of a corporation along with the corporation itself. See E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.
Supp. 371, 388 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (multiple representation not uncommon in corporate context); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.13(e), 1.7 (1987) (dual representation ethi-
cally permissible where conflicts of interest are avoided). Absent joint representation, however, the
lawyer for the corporation has an attorney-client relationship with the corporation and not with its
individual employees. See United States v. Piccini, 412 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1969) (corporate officer
could not claim privilege for communications to corporate attorney), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 917
(1970); see also cases cited infra note 34.
34. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986)
(corporate official may not prevent corporation from waiving privilege arising from discussions with
corporate counsel about corporate matters); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Mich., Aug.,
1977 (In re Jackier), 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (company officer cannot block testimony
of company attorney about interview with officer), aff'd per curiam, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978);
see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
35. In general, communications by a client to his attorney through an agent are privileged. Wig-
more indicates, "[tihe client's freedom of communication requires a liberty of employing other means
than his own personal action.... A communication, then, by any form of agency employed or set in
motion by the client is within the privilege." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2317, at 618 (emphasis
in original). Where the agent's principal is a corporation, however, the identity of the "client" be-
comes complicated. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (discussing special problems applying attorney-
client privilege in corporate context).
36. McCormick describes the problem as one of "extrapolating the essential operating conditions
of the privilege from the paradigm case of the traditional individual client who both supplies informa-
tion to, and receives counsel from, the attorney." MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 87, at 207.
37. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus
and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). This test was widely followed until the 1981 Supreme Court decision in
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun
Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1235-37 (3d Cir. 1979). But see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423
F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970) (describing "subject matter test" under which employee's communi-
cation to corporate attorney regarding job duties is privileged if made at direction of superiors), affd
by equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
38. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
39. Upjohn is binding only in federal cases in which the federal common law of privilege applies.
See FED. R. EvID. 501; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at 22 (Supp. 1987) (noting that because
Upjohn did not rest on constitutional basis, states may apply old "control group" test or other rules).
Compare National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. District Court, 718 P.2d 1044 (Colo.
1986) (adopting Upjohn as standard for corporate attorney-client privilege) with Consolidation Coal
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Like the individual attorney-client privilege, the corporate privilege is
justified as encouraging communication with corporate counsel.40 How-
ever, the incentives are less clear in the corporate context. Since most indi-
vidual employees of a corporation are not the "client" of the corporate
attorney and do not personally hold the privilege with regard to their
communications to the attorney, it seems unlikely that the attorney-client
privilege provides any incentive for corporate employees to divulge infor-
mation to the corporate attorney.41
A narrower justification for the corporate privilege responsive to that
criticism is that the corporate attorney-client privilege promotes "institu-
tional" communication with counsel. Assurances of confidentiality provide
incentives for the organizational client to investigate within its own ranks.
The theory is that without the assurance of an absolute privilege, the cor-
poration might not pursue certain inquiries for fear of compelled disclo-
sure."2 The Supreme Court has endorsed these policy underpinnings for
the corporate privilege, noting that the attorney-client privilege for corpo-
rations "encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration
of justice" by promoting full and frank communications between attorneys
and corporate clients. 3
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE GOVERNMENT CONTEXT
Nearly all decisions concerning the attorney-client privilege for entity
clients arise in the context of corporate clients being advised by lawyers.
Like corporations, government agencies are entity "clients" that seek legal
advice and are parties to litigation."' Although the scope of the attorney-
Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 II1. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982) (continuing to apply "control group"
test).
40. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (1985); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 955 (1956).
41. See Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Ap-
proach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 279, 306 (1984) (arguing that communication-maximizing rationale for
privilege should limit privilege to corporate employees who have authority to decide whether their
communications may be disclosed by corporation). A pre-Upjohn opinion from the Third Circuit
defended the control group theory for the corporate privilege, observing that any offer of confidential-
ity to lower-echelon employees is "illusory" where the corporation can waive the privilege and turn
employees' statements over to law enforcement officials. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.),
599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979).
42. See Note, supra note 19, at 670 n.15 (Upjohn management would not have initiated major
internal investigation had they believed government would be able to discover information collected).
But see Nath, Upjohn: A New Prescription for the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Defenses in Administrative Investigations, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 44-47 (1981) (potential legal
liabilities provided motivation for Upjohn's internal investigation); Recent Developments, 7 J. CORP.
L. 359, 372-73 & nn.88 & 91 (1982) (suggesting existence of privilege cannot be determinative moti-
vation for intracorporate communication).
43. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981);
Burnham, The Attorne,-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAW. 901, 913-14 (1969)
(free interchange between corporate clients and attorneys promotes voluntary compliance with laws).
44. Rules of evidence generally include public entities within the definition of "client." See, e.g.,
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1), 56 F.R.D. 235 (1972) ("A 'client' is a person, public officer, or
corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered
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client privilege in the government context has not been delineated clearly,
application of the attorney-client privilege to communications between at-
torneys and federal governmental agencies has paralleled application of
the corporate privilege."'
The rationale for the extension of the privilege in the government con-
text is rarely discussed. Prior to general acceptance of the corporate attor-
ney-client privilege, a few commentators suggested that a government en-
tity should have no traditional attorney-client privilege."' The only post-
Upjohn4 commentary on the privilege in the government context simply
asserts a need of the governmental client for assurances of confidentiality
equivalent to a corporation's need for confidential advice. 4" The cases ac-
cepting a governmental attorney-client privilege do not address the policy
of this privilege; a functional similarity between public and private bu-
reaucratic organizations usually is assumed with minimal discussion.' 9
professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional
legal services from him."); UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(1), 13 U.L.A. 256 (1986) (same).
As in corporate entity representation, the client of a government attorney is the government as an
entity. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 616 (D.D.C. 1979); G. HAZARD,
ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 46 (1978). The government is treated like any other party to civil
litigation for purposes of discovery. See 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 26.6112] (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
45. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 621 (D.D.C. 1979) (privilege
for government analogous to corporate privilege); see also Note, The Applicability and Scope of the
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, 62 B.U.L. REv. 1003
(1982) (urging extension of governmental attorney-client privilege to parallel corporate privilege).
46. Gardner argues that the personal nature of the attorney-client privilege makes extension of
the privilege to entities, including corporations and the government, inappropriate. See Gardner,
supra note 31; see also Lawry, Who is the Client of the Federal Government Lawyer? An Analysis of
the Wrong Question, 37 FED. B.J. 61, 68 (1978) (noting scattered authority for declining to extend
privilege).
47. 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see discussion supra Section I-C.
48. Note, supra note 45, at 1021 n.111.
49. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (where government uses attorneys as would any private party seeking advice to protect personal
interests, government needs same assurance of confidentiality); SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd.,
92 F.R.D. 65, 67 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (conclusorily citing Upjohn to extend privilege to communications
between SEC staff and SEC counsel); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Glen Arms Estate,
Inc., 230 Cal. App. 2d 841, 854, 41 Cal. Rptr. 303, 310 (1964) (extent of privilege "is the same
where the client is a body politic as where the client is a corporation"); see also Green v. IRS, 556 F.
Supp. 79, 85 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (privilege "unquestionably is applicable to the relationship between
Government attorneys and administrative personnel"), affd mem., 734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984); Jupi-
ter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 598 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (indicating
that "[clourts generally have accepted that attorney-client privilege applies in the governmental con-
text" but citing only work product and executive privilege cases).
Some cases fail to cite even facially supportive precedent for the extension of the privilege. For
example, Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), extends the
attorney-client privilege to a public body by citing only Wigmore, who does not address the issue of
government as client, and an Ohio case involving individual representation of a government official,
Rowley v. Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942). A more recent case discussing the govern-
mental attorney-client privilege confidently states, "[fQederal courts have uniformly held that the attor-
ney-client privilege can arise with respect to attorneys representing a state." Hearn v. Rhay, 68
F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Wash. 1975) (state prison officials are clients of state attorney general, and
privilege is applicable to confidential communications between attorney and agency control group).
However, the cited case authority for the proposition, United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1957), does not in fact address the attorney-client privilege.
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Corporations and government entities are dissimilar in ways that rec-
ommend against applying the corporate attorney-client privilege to gov-
ernmental agencies.50 Two important factors distinguish the government
agency from a private entity client: the public policy against secrecy in
governmental affairs, and the differing incentives for internal investigation
resulting from the unique public function of the government as a party to
civil litigation.
51
A. Open Government and Attorney-Client Privilege
The government has a special responsibility to make available to the
public information concerning government operations.52 The preeminent
codification of open government policy is the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).53 FOIA provides, inter alia, that agencies shall make government
records available to the public upon request.5 "4 Agencies may withhold in-
formation only in nine specifically exempted categories.
55
FOIA exemption 5 provides that a government agency need not release
to the public documents that would not be available "by law" to a private
party in litigation with the agency. 56 Exemption 5 insulates agency deci-
sionmaking from premature scrutiny;57 its protection extends to documents
50. Cf Note, DR 7-104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applied to the Government
"Party", 61 MINN. L. REV. 1007 (1977) (suggesting applicability of rule regarding contact with
parties represented by counsel be modified where multi-person entity represented by counsel is gov-
ernment body rather than corporation).
51. The sheer size of the federal government and the corresponding volume of potentially privi-
leged communications present an additional motivation to maintain a narrow approach to the attor-
ney-client privilege in the government context. Cf Jupiter Painting, 87 F.R.D. at 598 (acknowledg-
ing "pernicious potential" of attorney-client privilege in government context "top-heavy with
lawyers"); Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1976) (government claims of work
product privilege should be carefully reviewed because executive branch employs "unaccountable and
ever-growing number of attorneys").
52. See generally J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW SYSTEM 561-617 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing contours of public access to government
information).
53. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,
242 (1978) ("The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of
a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
governed.").
54. Enforcement is available through the federal district courts. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)-(G)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 79 & n.16 (2d Cir.
1979) (suggesting FOIA enforcement action in Court of Appeals also proper).
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 220-21; EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973) (FOIA exemptions
explicitly exclusive). These exemptions are to be narrowly construed. See United States Dep't of Jus-
tice v. Julian, 108 S. Ct. 1606, 1611 (1988); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,
361-62 (1976).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982) ("This section does not apply to matters that are... inter-agency
or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency.").
57. Chief Judge Wald has described the purposes of the government deliberative privilege:
[I]t serves to assure that subordinates within an agency will feel free to provide the deci-
sionmaker with their uninhibited opinions and recommendations without fear of later being
subject to public ridicule or criticism; to protect against premature disclosure of proposed poli-
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revealing deliberative processes5" and to the work product of government
legal advisors.59 Exemption 5 also has been found to encompass an attor-
ney-client privilege for communications between agency employees and
government attorneys.60 However, it would be a mistake to use exemption
5 to justify a broad attorney-client privilege for government entities.61
Congressional enactment of FOIA exemption 5 cannot be viewed as a
legislative mandate for application of the attorney-client privilege to gov-
cies before they have been finally formulated or adopted; and to protect against confusing the
issues and misleading the public by dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and ratio-
nales for a course of action which were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agency's action.
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1975) (quality of decisions protected by
privilege for deliberations). Exemption 5 does not apply to "final" statements of policy or agency
opinion but protects only deliberative communications. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at
151-54; Coastal States, 617 F.2d. at 868-69 (agency interpretations of regulations not exempt as
predecisional); see also Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (agency rulings
accorded precedental weight not exempt as deliberative predecisional documents).
58. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 150; Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 845 F.2d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1988) (documents must be "predecisional" and "deliberative");
Taxation With Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677-81 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (describing
features of documents exempt under deliberative process privilege); see also Dudman Communications
Corp. v. Department of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (exemption 5 protects from
disclosure draft manuscript of historical work on Vietnam War; editorial judgments included in pro-
tection of deliberative process). In defining the contours of the deliberative process exemption, the
Court has distinguished deliberative or advisory communications from factual information, indicating
that the latter generally is not to be exempted from disclosure. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-91
(1973); see also Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980). However,
exemption 5 does apply where disclosure of factual material would expose an agency's deliberative
processes. See Russell v. Department of the Air Force, 682 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lead Indus.
Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 85 (2d Cir. 1979); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Department of the Air
Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
59. See FTC v. Grolier, 462 U.S. 19 (1983); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 154
(Congress "had the attorney's work-product privilege specifically in mind when it adopted Exemption
5"). Some courts have limited exemption 5 to protect only work product information which also would
be shielded by the deliberative process privilege, permitting disclosure of purely "factual" work prod-
uct. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724, 734-37 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 437 U.S. 214 (1978); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1137-38 (4th Cir.
1977). The better (and more recent) rule, however, makes exemption 5 work product protection coex-
tensive with the work product privilege for civil discovery. See Martin v. Office of Special Counsel,
819 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Mink's factual/deliberative distinction limited to deliberative process
privilege; exemption 5 protects work product whether "factual" or "deliberative"). Accordingly, the
work product privilege is available only for documents prepared in contemplation of litigation. See
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d at 864-65 (privilege requires identifi-
able prospect of litigation); Niemeier v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 565 F.2d 967, 974 (7th
Cir. 1977) (no privilege where litigation foreclosed); see also infra notes 97-101 and accompanying
text (discussing attorney work product doctrine).
60. See Brinton v. Department of State, 636 F.2d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Both congressional
intent and judicial precedent establish the attorney-client privilege as a ground for applying Exemp-
tion 5."), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Department of the Air Force,
566 F.2d at 252-53 (attorney-client privilege included in exemption 5). However, the attorney-client
privilege rarely provides the sole basis for the privilege of a document sought under FOIA. See, e.g.,
Brinton, 636 F.2d at 604 (legal advice also falls within deliberative process exception).
61. Some courts have been wary of extending the FOIA privilege to the full breadth of a common
law attorney-client privilege for government agencies. See Niemeier, 565 F.2d at 974 & n.23 (purpose
of FOIA limits attorney-client privilege to narrower work product privilege); Falcone v. IRS, 479 F.
Supp. 985, 989-90 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (attorney-client privilege as applied in FOIA cases narrower
than in civil discovery and limited to purposes of privilege in agency context).
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ernmental agencies.62 The suggestion in the legislative history of this ex-
emption that the attorney-client privilege applies to the government as to
private parties is, at most, a congressional estimation of the common law
of privilege in the government context.6" If federal courts were to limit the
attorney-client privilege in the government context, FOIA exemptions
would be likewise limited.64 FOIA's text and legislative history therefore
do not compel a governmental attorney-client privilege.
Some states have distinguished public agencies from other clients for
purposes of the attorney-client privilege,65 and in at least some cases the
distinction has been motivated by the type of open government concerns
motivating FOIA.66 For example, the Florida Supreme Court has limited
the attorney-client privilege for governmental agencies, holding that the
privilege does not provide an exception to the state statute requiring open
meetings and disclosure of public records.67 In addition, the Revised Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1974 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Rules, 6  provide in Rule 502 that com-
munications between a public agency and its attorney are not privileged
unless a court determines that disclosure will "seriously impair the ability
of the public officer or agency to process the claim or conduct a pending
62. The statute as enacted indicates that the FOIA exemptions will follow federal common law
regarding what documents are not available "by law" in litigation. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982); see
Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1975)
(FOIA exemptions "were not intended to create evidentiary privileges for civil discovery"), affd, 426
U.S. 394 (1976); Denny v. Carey, 78 F.R.D. 370, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (FOIA exemption does not
create independent evidentiary privilege).
63. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (exemption 5
protects documents including "the working papers of the agency attorney and documents which would
come within the attorney-client privilege if applied to private parties").
64. Cf. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 108, at 266 (discussing relationship between FOIA excep-
tions and evidemtiary privileges).
65. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 502(d)(2) (1979) (Arkansas attorney-client privi-
lege rule does not protect communication between public officer or agency and government lawyers);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, Rule 502(d)(6) (same); N.D.R. EVID. 502(d)(6) (same), reprinted in
5B N.D. CENT. CODE § 268 (Supp. 1987).
66. See, e.g., Eastern Or. Mining Ass'n v. Grant County, 51 U.S.L.W. 2669 (D. Or. Apr. 22,
1983) (Oregon public meetings law operates as waiver of privilege for communications between city
officials and city attorneys at meetings required by law to be open).
67. City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 468 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985) (written
communications between lawyer and governmental clients generally not exempt from disclosure as
public records); Neu v. State, 462 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985) (discussion between city council and city
attorney must be open to public); see also Turner, Florida's Open Government Laws: No Exceptions
for Attorney-Client Communications, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 389 (1985); Smith, The Public Records
Law and the Sunshine Law: No Attorney-Client Privilege Per Se, and Limited Attorney Work Prod-
uct Exemption, 14 STErsON L. REv. 493, 506-11 (1985) (enactment of privilege statute did not
abrogate "preeminent public policy" assuring public access to government records). But see City of
Melbourne v. A.T.S. Melbourne, Inc., 475 So. 2d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Miami Herald
superseded by amendment of public record law providing exemption for attorney work product during
pendency of litigation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.07(3)(o) (West 1985) (public record containing
"mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory" prepared by government attorney
for litigation or adversarial proceeding is temporarily exempt from disclosure under public records
law).
68. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE 145 (1974).
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investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the public interest." 9 Rule 502's
public agency exception to the attorney-client privilege is not universally
accepted but has been adopted in some states.10
B. Limits to the Corporate Analogy
As a party to litigation, the government entity has a unique public
function. The government has an obligation to advance the public interest
in litigation, a feature distinguishing government attorneys from attorneys
for private parties.71 The government attorney must seek a fair result be-
yond, or rather as the ultimate manifestation of, the interests of the gov-
ernment client.7 2 The government also has a responsibility to act lawfully
and to police itself that arguably surpasses any analogous duty on the part
69. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(d)(6), 13A U.L.A. 257, 257-58 (1985).
70. Maine, Arkansas, and North Dakota are among the states that have adopted Rule 502(d)(6)
of the Uniform Rules. See supra note 65. However, Weinstein's survey of state evidence rules indi-
cates that the Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence exception for public agencies frequently is omitted.
E.g., 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at 503-S1 (South Dakota privilege rule deletes public
entity exception).
71. This public responsibility may even outweigh the government's interest in winning a particu-
lar lawsuit:
The United States attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest . . . is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) provides that the duty of a
public prosecutor is to "seek justice, not merely to convict." Prosecutors must disclose to the defendant
exculpatory evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (prosecutor has constitutional obli-
gation to disclose facts favorable to criminal defendant). Similarly, the government lawyer in a civil
action must "seek justice" and avoid unfair settlements or results. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980); see also City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860, 871, 558
P.2d 545, 551, 135 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653 (1977) (duty of government attorney in eminent domain
action includes developing full and fair record to arrive at just compensation); Schnapper, Legal Eth-
ics and the Government Lawyer, 32 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 649, 655 (1977) (government attorney has
ethical obligation in civil litigation paralleling constitutional obligation in criminal case). See generally
Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C.L. Rav. 625, 627-31 (1979) (discussing
ethical provisions reflecting special obligations of government attorneys).
72. The Professional Ethics Committee of the Federal Bar Association described the public trust
of the federally employed lawyer:
[T]he government, over-all and in each of its parts, is responsible to the people in our democ-
racy with its representative form of government. Each part of the government has the obliga-
tion of carrying out, in the public interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consistent
with the Constitution, and the applicable laws and regulations. In contrast, the private practi-
tioner represents the client's personal or private interest. . . . [W]e do not suggest, however,
that the public is the client as the client concept is usually understood. It is to say that the
lawyer's employment requires him to observe in the performance of his professional responsi-
bility the public interest sought to be served by the governmental organization of which he is a
part.
Federal Bar Association Ethics Committee, The Government Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-
1, 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973) [hereinafter Opinion 73-11; see also FEDERAL ETHICAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS 5-1, 6-1, 7-2 (Fed. B. Ass'n 1973) (noting the public interest functions of the federal govern-
ment attorney), reprinted in Poirier, The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60
A.B.A. J. 1541, 1543-44 (1974); Josephson & Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe
the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539, 555-57 (1986) (discussing
public trust of government lawyers).
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of private business enterprises. While corporate employees bear no legal
responsibility to report wrongdoing,"3 individual employees of the govern-
ment have obligations to report illegal activity by other government em-
ployees.74 Further, unlike an attorney for a private corporation, the attor-
ney for a government agency has an obligation to act on discovered
wrongdoing.
7 5
As in the corporate setting,78 but to an even greater degree, it is unclear
how the attorney-client privilege for governmental entities can promote
candor from individuals who are unable to prevent the ultimate waiver of
the privilege.7 7 Given the obligation of government attorneys to report
wrongdoing, the legal representative of a government entity cannot assure
government employees the degree of confidentiality sufficient to the goals
of the attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, in litigation to which the
government is a party, some litigation strategy is directed by the legal
advisor rather than the client;78 thus, even government officials in posi-
73. Mere failure to report a crime does not constitute misprision of a felony under the federal
misprision of felony statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), or under most state common law or statutory
provisions. See United States v. Ciambrone, 750 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4
requires positive act of concealment); United States v. Davila, 698 F.2d 715, 717 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 703 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); see also Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806 (Fla. App.
1974) (common law crime of misprision not adopted in Florida law); MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5
commentary at 251 (1980) (model code "accords with vast majority of jurisdictions in assigning no
penalty to simple failure to inform authorities of criminal conduct"); id. at 256-57 (requirements of
affirmative concealment and intent to prevent justice generally nullify misprision provisions); Note,
Forcing Bystanders to Get Involved: The Case for a Statute Requiring Witnesses to Report Crime, 94
YALE L.J. 1787, 1793 (1985) (majority view has been that misprision of felony requires element
beyond failure to report). See generally Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491,
517-21 (discussing absence of obligation to report crimes).
74. See H.R. Con. Res. 175, 72 Stat. B12 (1958) "Code of Ethics for Government Service" ("Any
person in the Government service should: ... (9) Expose corruption wherever discovered .... ). 28
U.S.C. § 535 (1966) additionally requires department heads to "expeditiously report[]" information
regarding criminal conduct by government employees to the Attorney General. Numerous federal
agencies reinforce these requirements by engaging in governmental oversight. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §
0.39a (1988) (Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility investigates allegations of
misconduct by department employees). While some of these ethical and legal provisions for govern-
ment employees and attorneys and for public agencies may be largely hortatory, they nonetheless are
distinctive to the public sphere.
75. FEDERAL ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 4-3 (Fed. B. Ass'n 1973) (federal lawyer has ethical
responsibility to disclose information revealing official misconduct), reprinted in Poirier, supra note
72, at 1543; Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (while general
ethical obligation of attorney is to maintain confidences of client, attorney may reveal information
necessary to "prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm").
76. See Gardner, supra note 31, at 376-84 (arguments against corporate privilege apply in gov-
ernment context); id. at 379 (assumption that privilege applies to governmental bodies is "even more
fallacious" than assumption of corporate privilege).
77. Under the "entity" theory of representation for corporations adopted in Upjohn, a government
attorney could avoid individual representation of an individual government employee while preserving
for the government the attorney-client privilege for communications with the employee. See discussion
supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. The applicability of Upjohn in the government context has
not been discussed explicitly in federal case law, although McCormick suggests that an analogous rule
protecting communications from employees is appropriate for agency situations not involving corpora-
tions. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 96, at 233; see also Note, supra note 45.
78. See Weinstein & Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government Attorneys
and Clients, I ToURo L. REv. 1 (1985) (government attorney's obligation to public requires deci-
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tions analogous to a corporate "control group" would not have enough
control over the litigation to be moved to communicate with the agency's
lawyer. Finally, government employees always run the risk that successor
officials in a current or later administration will waive the attorney-client
privilege covering prior communications with counsel."9 In sum, entity
representation in the government context removes the assurances of confi-
dentiality necessary to promote communications between government at-
torneys and agency employees. The attorney-client privilege for govern-
ment agencies therefore cannot be justified as promoting individual
disclosures.
Application of the policy justifications for the organizational attorney-
client privilege further distinguishes governmental agencies from private
businesses. For corporations, the attorney-client privilege is justified as
promoting "entity" communications."0 Corporations use legal advice" to
pursue voluntary compliance with the law and need the attorney-client
privilege to encourage internal examinations necessary for such compli-
ance. 2 Such internal investigations generate information that might not
otherwise exist and certainly would not otherwise be neatly packaged for
adversarial discovery. 8 Keeping such investigations confidential and privi-
leged helps minimize the risk of liability that might result from the release
of such information and thus allows corporations to patrol their own
wrongdoing.8 4
The profit motives of corporations distinguish those business entities
from government agencies. Corporations have disincentives to investigate
not shared by the government, since the ability of a business entity to
sionmaking independent of agency client's direction).
79. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 357 (1985) (rejecting
argument that giving bankruptcy trustee control of privilege will have chilling effect on communica-
tions with attorney; chilling effect is no greater than in solvent corporation, where successor manage-
ment may waive corporation's attorney-client privilege for prior management's communications with
counsel).
80. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
81. Internal investigations conducted for a business purpose other than giving legal advice to a
corporation are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91; see
also supra note 28.
82. See supra note 43. This need to shield corporate internal investigations from discovery also is
reflected in a nascent privilege for what has been termed "self-critical analysis." See Bredice v. Doc-
tors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970) (hospital self-evaluation given qualified privilege
on basis of "overwhelming public interest" in unimpeded information flow for improvement of health
care), afld, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Leonard, Codifying A Privilege for Self-Critical Analy-
sis, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113 (1988); Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1083 (1983).
83. See Block & Remz, The Confidentiality of Corporate Internal Investigations, 18 SEc. &
COMMODITIES REG. 61, 61-62 (1985) (internal investigative files may offer private litigant or law
enforcement agency "detailed roadmap" for litigation).
84. See Crisman & Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product
Doctrine in Internal Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate "Self-Evaluative" Privilege,
21 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 123, 124-25 & passim (1983) (discussing need for confidentiality of corporate
internal investigations).
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compete is at risk if wrongdoing is discovered or discoverable." Economic
incentives may work in two directions. Where the costs of voluntary com-
pliance are lower than the costs of "involuntary" compliance after discov-
ery by a law enforcement agency or injured plaintiff, corporations may
choose to employ internal investigations."' However, economic vulnerabil-
ity may make a profit-motivated corporation shy away from exposure to
liability or adverse publicity. Since the survival of government entities
generally does not hinge on competitive success, this incentive to hide (or
never to uncover) misconduct is less powerful in the government context."
An absolute privilege for communications with counsel therefore is less
important in the government's incentive structure than it is in the private
sphere.88
In addition, the Supreme Court has suggested that responsibility to the
public may defeat evidentiary privileges protecting professional relation-
ships. In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 9 the Supreme Court
declined to extend a work product privilege to public accountants, indicat-
ing that an auditor's obligation to serve the public interest distinguishes
the accountant from an attorney "whose duty it is to present the client's
case in the most favorable possible light." 90 The Court found it significant
that accountants perform "a public responsibility transcending any em-
ployment relationship with the client.""1 The government's public respon-
85. Business competition may motivate both secrecy about wrongdoing and wrongdoing itself. For
a general discussion of the structural and economic origins of corporate misconduct, see Vaughan,
Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Behavior, 80 MICH. L. Rav. 1377 (1982).
86. See Nath, supra note 42, at 44-47; In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224,
1237 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[P]otential costs of undetected noncompliance are themselves high enough to
ensure that corporate officials will authorize investigations regardless of an inability to keep such
investigations completely confidential."). The SEC "voluntary disclosure program" provides incentives
for corporations to self-police and to conduct internal investigations. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d
793, 800-01 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing voluntary disclosure program); Report of the Securities and
Exchange Comm'n on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 353 Supp. (May 19, 1976) (same); see also Recent Developments, supra note 42, at
373 n.88 (suggesting Upjohn Co. would not have undertaken internal investigation absent public
opinion pressure and voluntary disclosure program).
87. Noneconomic incentives for hiding government misconduct are diffuse and individualized and
are not countered by extension of the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERN-
MENT passim (1983) (arguing that public officials are risk averse; self-protective official behavior is
motivated in part by individual officials' fear of litigation and is best remedied by reform of liability
system shifting liability to government entity).
88. It might be argued that the privilege nonetheless gives the government some ability and "in-
centive" to perform internal investigations and should therefore be retained. However, the attorney-
client privilege is an unwieldy mechanism for encouraging governmental self-policing. The scope of
the privilege is broad (potentially extending to legal communications with thousands of federal em-
ployees) and its protection is absolute, while the benefits are even less clear than in the corporate
context. In addition, agencies will not be inhibited from seeking legal advice absent the privilege
because other privileges protect intragovernmental communications and attorney work product. See
infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
89. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
90. Id. at 817.
91. Id.
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sibility is even more manifest than an accountant's, and a governmental
attorney-client privilege can be similarly distinguished.
An exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege also has been
applied where the client asserting the privilege is "an entity which in the
performance of its functions acts wholly or partly in the interests of
others, and those others, or some of them, seek access to the subject matter
of the communications."92 In Garner v. Wolfinbarger, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that since the management of a corporation has a duty to protect
stockholders, stockholders should be permitted to show cause why the at-
torney-client privilege should not be invoked." Under Garner, an entity
acting in the interests of others has a semi-permeable, rather than an ab-
solute, privilege for its communications with counsel.9 Since the govern-
ment is properly constrained to act wholly or partly in the interests of the
citizenry,95 the dicta in Garner regarding entity responsibility toward the
opposing party suggest that the government's public responsibility makes
it appropriate to limit the government's attorney-client privilege."8
C. Extra-Privilege Protections for Sensitive Information
Denial of the attorney-client privilege to government agencies will not
hamper governmental functions or litigation by exposing sensitive commu-
nications to public scrutiny. The government enjoys broad protection of its
"mental processes" and deliberations which extends to most communica-
tions between agencies and their legal advisors. Existing protections, in-
cluding exemptions to the FOIA, special governmental privileges, and the
attorney work product doctrine, offer sufficient protection for the govern-
ment's legitimate interests in confidentiality.
Communications between the attorney for the government party and his
client often will fall within the protection of the attorney work product
92. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
93. Id. at 1103-04. The Garner exception has been extended to other fiduciary relationships. See
Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906 (D.D.C. 1982)
(trustee of employee benefit plan may not assert privilege to keep information from plan benefi-
ciaries). See generally Developments: Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 10, at 1526-27 (discussing
extensions of Garner exception).
94. See Developments: Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 10, at 1527-28 (fiduciary duty un-
dermines adverseness in litigation between fiduciary and beneficiary).
95. The government's duty to serve the public interest diminishes the adversary nature of litiga-
tion to which the government is a party. See supra note 69; cf. supra note 92.
96. At least one court has limited Garner's policy rationale to cases in which a shareholder brings
a derivative suit to vindicate the interests of the corporation. Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research
& Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 23 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Note, The Shareholders' Derivative-
Claim Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at
199 (criticizing Garner). While suits against the government to enforce public rights arguably are
analogous to such shareholder actions, standing obstacles bar most such cases against the government.
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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doctrine."' Under the work product doctrine, an opposing party may not
discover the work product of an attorney, including the attorney's ideas
and litigation strategy as "reflected . . .in interviews, statements, memo-
randa, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and
countless other tangible and intangible ways.""8 The doctrine has been
extended to the government and protects the government party's strategic
interests in litigation." Unlike the attorney-client privilege, 00 the work
product doctrine is not an absolute bar to disclosure of the protected com-
munication; an attorney's work product is discoverable upon an adequate
showing of necessity.' 1 The work product doctrine thus accords substan-
tial protection to the opinion work product of attorneys for the govern-
ment distinct from an absolute privilege for attorney-client
communications.
A special governmental privilege protects governmental deliberative
processes, including the opinions, conclusions, and reasoning of govern-
ment officials. 10 2 This privilege has been extended to consultations be-
tween agencies and legal counsel.0' Like the work product privilege, this
privilege is not absolute; the protection is weighed in each case and may
be countered by a demonstrated need for the information.'"
97. The seminal work product case is Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The doctrine also
is codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), which provides:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable ...
and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative ... only upon a showing that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an at-
torney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
98. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
99. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154 (1975); Detroit Screwmatic Co. v. United
States, 49 F.R.D. 77, 78 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518 (D. Colo.
1963) (memoranda discussing legal arguments and conclusions were work product of government at-
torney and exempt from disclosure absent very good cause).
100. See Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 150-51 (D. Del. 1977) (distinguishing
purposes of attorney-client privilege and work product immunity); Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Gro-
cery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (same); 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAGTICE, supra note
44, at 1 26.64[41 (comparing attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine).
101. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (work product discoverable upon showing of "substantial need"
and where materials not otherwise available without "undue hardship"); FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462
U.S. 19, 27 (1983) ("Under the current state of the law relating to the privilege, work-product mater-
ials are immune from discovery unless the one seeking discovery can show substantial need in connec-
tion with subsequent litigation."). While Rule 26(b)(3) provides special protection for a lawyer's
opinion work product, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-01 (1981), even opinion
work product may be disclosed upon an adequate showing of necessity by the party seeking disclosure,
see Byers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436, 439-40 (D.D.C. 1983); see also 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 44, at 726.64[3.-2] (2d ed. & Supp. 1987-88).
102. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966),
affd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See generally MCCORMICK, supra note
9, § 108, at 266-67.
103. See, e.g., Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ind. 1982), affid mem., 734 F.2d 18 (7th
Cir. 1984).
104. See Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
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Finally, absolute protection separate from the attorney-client privilege
is available for those state secrets which should not be disclosed because of
danger to the public interest. Common law and statutory privileges protect




As a general rule, privileges should extend no further than the underly-
ing policies require and should be strictly construed in accordance with
their purpose. This Note urges the exercise of judicial restraint in the
extension of the attorney-client privilege to contexts in which a govern-
ment agency is the client.10 8 Although the case law has moved toward
extending to government agencies a privilege parallel to the corporate
privilege, this trend should be arrested.
An absolute privilege for attorney-client communications in the govern-
ment context compromises both the logic of the evidentiary privilege and
the important public policy of openness in government affairs. Limitation
of the attorney-client privilege in the government context would preserve
the absolute privilege for circumstances in which it would promote attor-
ney-client communications and aid in the administration of justice.
Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. at 327.
105. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
106. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
107. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-12 (1967).
108. This limitation should not exclude from the privilege communications between a government
attorney and a government employee represented in his individual capacity. An attorney for the gov-
ernment may act as the legal representative for a government employee sued or subpoenaed in his
individual capacity only where such representation would be in the interest of the United States. 28
C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (1987). Where an attorney employed by the federal government is designated to
represent a government employee as an individual, the usual attorney-client relationship arises. Opin-
ion 73-1, supra note 72, at 72-73; FEDERAL ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS Canons 4-4, 6-1, 7-1 (Fed.
B. Ass'n 1973), reprinted in Poirier, supra note 72. Since the individual client may retain or waive
the attorney-client privilege in accordance with his own interests, the incentives to communicate with
counsel are intact and the purposes of the attorney-client privilege are served.
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